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Summary − Based on expert opinions, informative prior elicitation for the common Weibull
lifetime distribution usually presents some difficulties since it requires to elicit a two-dimensional
joint prior. We consider here a reliability framework where the available expert information
states directly in terms of prior predictive values (lifetimes) and not parameter values, which
are less intuitive. The novelty of our procedure is to weigh the expert information by the size
m of a virtual sample yielding a similar information, the prior being seen as a reference poste-
rior. Thus, the prior calibration by the Bayesian analyst, who has to moderate the subjective
information with respect to the data information, is made simple. A main result is the full
tractability of the prior under mild conditions, despite the conjugation issues encountered
with the Weibull distribution. Besides, m is a practical focus point for discussion between
analysts and experts, and a helpful parameter for leading sensitivity studies and reducing
the potential imbalance in posterior selection between Bayesian Weibull models, which can
be due to favoring arbitrarily a prior. The calibration of m is discussed and a real example
is treated along the paper.
Key Words − subjective prior elicitation, Weibull distribution, expert opinion, virtual
data, posterior prior.
1 Introduction
The versatile Weibull W(η, β) distribution, with density function
fW (t|η, β) = β
η
(
t
η
)β−1
exp
{
−
(
t
η
)β}
1{t≥0}
(η, β) ∈ (0,∞)2, is one of the most popular distributions in reliability and risk assessment
(RRA) and many other fields, mainly chosen for modelling the lifetime T of an industrial
system or component Σ [39]. In real-life studies, a Bayesian framework has often been
highlighted when expert knowledge is available on Σ and observed lifetime data tn = t1, . . . , tn
are small-sized and possibly contain missing or censored values [2]. Such contexts are usually
1
ar
X
iv
:1
00
7.
47
40
v3
  [
sta
t.M
E]
  2
1 O
ct 
20
10
encountered in industrial studies, especially when economical opportunities imply replacing a
range of components at the same time, although they could have carried on running, and lead
to “polluted” (e.g., censored) lifetime data. In those cases, all relevant sources of knowledge
as expert opinion must be taken into account.
Therefore, numerous authors [34, 35, 6] have focused their work on the elicitation of
a joint prior measure pi(η, β) that formalizes the expert knowledge, in order to integrate
some decision-making function over the joint posterior distribution of these parameters, with
density
pi(η, β|tn) = L(tn; η, β) pi(η, β)∫∫
IR2+
L(tn; η, β) pi(η, β) dηdβ
,
where L(tn; η, β) denotes the data likelihood. There are two main difficulties using the
Weibull distribution. First, its only conjugate prior distribution is continuous-discrete [36]
and remains difficult to justify in real problems [20]. Second, the meanings of scale parameter
η and shape parameter β greatly differ. Their values and correlation remain hard to assess
by non-statistician experts, even though historical results [23] can be used to provide pref-
erential values as a function of the behavior of the studied system. The methods proposed
by the previous authors can suffer from this second defect and be applicable with difficulty.
Therefore Kaminskiy & Krivtsov [20] recently provided a simple procedure to elicit a prior
pi(η, β) using expert knowledge about the mean and standard deviation of the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) FW . They insisted on the fact that these values are easier to
assess than parameter values.
However, especially in sensitive areas like nuclear safety [42], resorting to a Bayesian
framework for reliability-based decision-helping implies defending the metholodology of prior
elicitation in front of control authorities, the traditional difficulty being the treatment of its
subjective aspects [16]. According to most wishes expressed by decisionners in our practice,
the elicitation of a “defendable” prior pi(θ) (of any model parametrized by θ and not only
Weibull) should respect the following items: (a) the quantity of subjective information can
be directly compared, in terms of percentage, to the quantity of objective (data) information;
and (b) the elicited prior must be unique.
One could add to this list other wishes as the practical handling of the prior (explicit
features and easy sampling), which is of importance for sensitivity studies. Note that the
first item requires to give a clear sense to the words “quantity of information”. Statistical
definitions like inverse Fisher matrices or Shannon entropies are often too technical to be
directly accessible to decisionners.
This article addresses those concerns. In the sequel, we consider an alternative elicitation
of pi(η, β) defined as the reference posterior of virtual data of size m but calibrated from
lifetime magnitudes directly given by experts, pursuing the worry of realism expressed by
Kaminskiy & Krivtsov [20]. Since the virtual size corresponds to an intuitive measure of
prior uncertainty, ratios of virtual and observed data sizes bring an understandable sense
to the notion of “relative quantity of information”. It can appear simpler than standard
deviations (or other typical statistical uncertainty measures) to discuss with non-statistician
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experts and, especially, lead to more transparent choices to decisionners.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The full prior elicitation is detailed in (the
largest) Section 2. This methodological section focuses on the calibration of hyperparam-
eters, the aggregation of independent expert opinions and the equitability issues between
Bayesian Weibull models. Posterior computation is considered in Section 3. A numerical
application on a real case-study is treated along the paper to illustrate the methodology. A
Discussion section ends the paper, presenting alternative results and some avenues for future
research.
2 Prior elicitation
2.1 Principle
The central idea of prior elicitation comes from a simple vision of informative expert opin-
ion already suggested by Lindley [26]. We suggest to consider that a perfect expert opinion
should be, roughly speaking, similar to a real data survey, and provide an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) sample t˜m = (t˜1, . . . , t˜m) of lifetime data. Now, let pi
J be
a well-recognized formal representation of ignorance (namely, a noninformative prior), per-
ceived as a reference benchmark measure on the parameter space. Assuming t˜m is known,
the corresponding prior pi should be the posterior distribution with density piJ(η, β |˜tm).
Posterior priors. Priors built as virtual posteriors present some advantages in subjective
Bayesian analysis. First, they are unique since only defined by piJ and the likelihood (often
historically chosen in experiments). Second, the correlation between parameters is automat-
ically assessed through the Bayes rule. Third, as said before, the ratio between the numbers
of virtual and real data helps to yield an understandable answer to the (often unclear) ques-
tion “what is the ratio between subjective and objective information” asked by cautious
decision-makers. Finally, the aggregation of independent expert opinions is simply carried
out through successive Bayes rules, the consensus virtual sample being an aggregation of all
virtual data. This avoids choosing opinion pooling rules which can suffer from paradoxes
[30].
Maybe the most famous of such elicited priors is Zellner’s g−prior [43]. Among others,
Clarke [12], Neal [29], Ka´rny et al. [21], Lin et al. [25] and Morita et al. [28] examined various
quantification of priors using virtual data. Kontkanen et al. [22] considered virtual data as
practical tools for eliciting priors for Bayesian networks which may require automation in the
treatment of their parameters.
However, because of various factors, especially subjective ones, the sample t˜m is not di-
rectly elicitable from an expert, and his or her information on lifetime T must be summarized
through questioning processes [30]. This type of elicitation remains simple for distributions
belonging to the natural exponential family, for which the resulting posterior priors are con-
jugate (cf. [32], § 5.3.3), because the virtual sample can be replaced by exhaustive statistics.
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In the continuous Weibull case, unfortunately, the only exhaustive statistic is the full virtual
likelihood. Therefore the questioning must be oriented such that it allows the calibration of
nonexhaustive virtual statistics.
Expert questioning. In a concern of realism, following the ideas promoted by Kadane
& Wolfson [19] and especially Percy [31] in the field of RRA, we consider that an expert is
mainly capable of providing observable information on T , unconditionally to (η, β). Indeed,
the experts are usually not statisticians and should yield information independently from
any parametrization choice (and even from any sampling model choice) made by a Bayesian
analyst [21]. In other terms we assume that any realistic statistical summary of an expert
opinion should be defined with respect to its associated prior predictive density, namely the
prior density of plausible lifetime values
fpi(t) =
∫∫
IR2+
fW (t|η, β)pi(η, β) dηdβ. (1)
The density form of de Finetti’s representation theorem [14] is then invoked to ensure the
unicity of priors elicited in this way, under mild conditions of exchangeability for sequences
of values t1, . . . , tn, . . . See Press [32], § 10.5, for more precisions. Linking typical magnitudes
of the observable variable T with statistical specifications can be made through decision-
theoretical arguments. In the following, we consider experts who can answer to a question
similar to the following one:
Can you give estimates of relative costs (c1, c2) linked to two reliability-based decisions
induced by the two mutually exclusive events T ≤ tα and T > tα?
provided tα is given by the analyst (to improve the phenomenon anchoring of the expert
and diminish subjective bias, cf. [41]) and denoting α = c1/(c1 + c2) ∈ [0, 1]. Doing so,
following the standard criterion of decision theory, namely the expected utility [33], the analyst
interprets tα as the minimizer of the predictive Bayes risk
tα = arg min
t0>0
∫ ∞
0
Λ(t0, t|c1, c2)fpi(t) dt.
defined by some loss function Λ(t0, t|c1, c2) between the choice T = t0 and the unknown truth
T = t, inflicting c1 to the event t ≤ t0 (underestimation) and c2 to the contrary event t > t0
(overestimation). The common choice
Λ(t0, t|c1, c2) = |t− t0|
(
c1 · 1{t≤t0} + c2 · 1{t>t0}
)
,
which underlies the analyst wants to penalize similarly small and large misestimations [33],
leads to tα taking the sense of the α−order prior predictive percentile
Ppi(T < tα) =
∫ tα
0
fpi(t) dt = α. (2)
Therefore an alternative equivalent query is, perhaps simpler, what is the risk α for Σ to
break down before tα?
4
In the following, we assume finally that for each available expert, a unique specified cou-
ple (tα, α) among all elicitable can be considered as his or her most trustworthy specification
(MTS) and must be exactly respected in the effective predictive prior modelling. Various
reasons can be invoked for this. First, one cannot hope to elicit a prior pi(η, β) such that
an arbitrary large number of specified couples (tα, α) be exactly respected together, because
of the limited flexibility of parametric distributions (Berger 1985 [4], chap. 3). Second, a
MTS often appears as a reality since experts have usually more difficulty to speak in terms
of extreme values rather than values close to the median behavior [30]. Typically, they can
share a similar MTS while their extremes can differ (see Example 1). Other arguments can
be related to decision-making: a cautious, conservative couple (tα, α) can be favored by the
analyst since the posterior analysis is focused on percentiles of higher, more critical orders.
Example 1. Table 1, already used in [8], summarizes two prior opinions about the lifetime
T (in months) of a device belonging to the secondary water circuit of French nuclear plants.
According to a large consensus in the RRA field, T is assumed to be well described by a Weibull
distribution. Giving a normative sense to extreme events (90% credibility), these experts were
not questionned at the same level of precision. E1 is a nuclear operator and spoke about a
particular component, in terms of replacement costs. Conversely, E2 is a component vendor
whose opinion took into account a variety of operating conditions. Costs invoked here were
mainly related to mass production. Therefore the two experts can be considered independent.
Hence the common median appears as a robust specification and is chosen as the MTS for
both.
Credibility intervals (5%,95%) Median value
expert E1 [200,300] 250
expert E2 [100,500] 250
Table 1: Expert opinions about the lifetime T of a nuclear device (in months).
2.2 A comfortable prior form
Let us choose piJ as the Jeffreys prior for Weibull. In more general Bayesian settings, Sun
[37] proposed to favor the Berger-Bernardo reference prior [5] since it has slightly better
properties of frequentist posterior coverage. But this prior requires at least m ≥ 2 to get
proper posteriors. This would be limiting in practice, when m is chosen small as it could be
expected in cautious subjective assessments. Moreover, expert knowledge exerts here itself
on T and not on any Weibull parametrization, therefore it seems relevant that a benchmark
piJ be parametrization-invariant. See [12] for a straightforward defence of Jeffreys’ prior in
related problems, where a subjective posterior has to be compared in information-theoretic
terms to an objective posterior. Thus we consider
piJ(η, β) ∝ η−11{η≥0}1{β≥β0}
where β0 ≥ 0 is assumed to be fixed by objective reasons, like physical constraints. For
instance, a reliability study focusing on industrial components submitted to aging leads to
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choose β0 = 1 as explained in Bacha (1998) [2], since involving a time-increasing failure rate.
Without particular constraint, β0 = 0. Scale invariance imposes no other lower bound than
0 for η.
Denote GIG(a, b, γ) the generalized inverse gamma distribution with density
f(x) =
baγ
Γ(a)
1
xaγ+1
exp
(
− b
xγ
)
1{x≥0}.
Reparametrizing x in µ = x−γ , µ ∼ G(a, b). Then our ideal prior is pi(η, β) = pi(η|β)pi(β),
such that
η|β ∼ GIG (m, b(˜tm, β), β) , (3)
pi(β) ∝ β
m−1
bm(˜tm, β)
exp
(
m
β
β(˜tm)
)
1{β≥β0} (4)
with b(˜tm, β) =
∑m
i=1 t˜
β
i , and β(˜tm) = m(
∑m
i=1 log t˜i)
−1. Both distributions are proper for
all m > 0. The unknown virtual unsufficient statistics b(˜tm, β) and β(˜tm) must be replaced
in function of available expert information. The linkage between the prior form promoted in
(3-4) and a MTS (tα, α) elicitable for a given expert can be done as explained in the next
proposition (proved in Appendix) and its corollary.
Proposition 1. For α ∈]0, 1[ and tα > 0, define the function bα : IN∗ × IR∗+ by
bα(m,β) =
(
(1− α)−1/m − 1
)−1
tα
β . (5)
Then bα(m,β) is the only β−continuous function such that, being substituted to b(˜tm, β) in
(3), Equation (2) is verified almost surely.
An immediate and pleasant consequence of replacing deterministic expression b(˜tm, β) by
bα(m,β) is that pi(β) ∝ βm−1 exp
(−mβ log tα +mβ/β(˜tm))1{η≥0}. We recognize here the
general term of a gamma distribution truncated in β0. Finally the resulting prior is
η|β ∼ GIG (m, bα(m,β), β) , (6)
β ∼ G
(
m,
m
β˜(m)
)
1{β≥β0} (7)
where β˜(m) =
(
log tα − β−1(˜tm)
)−1
. This result deserves some technical remarks.
(i) The joint prior propriety imposes β−1(˜tm) < log tα, namely
∏m
i=1 t˜i < t
m
α .
(ii) The joint prior (6-7) can remain proper for all m extended on the half-line IR∗+. Thus
fuzzy or doubtful experts can be graded using m ≤ 1. This might be valuable if a group
of P experts is considered as yielding less information than P i.i.d. data, for instance
because they are suspected of mutual influence.
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(iii) The GIG(a, b, γ) distribution was firstly used by Berger & Sun [6], b being assessed
independently of β. However, this choice was made only because of the posterior
conjugate properties conditionally to β (see § 3), and no meaning was given to the
hyperparameters. Authors like Tsionas [39] adopted similar approaches.
2.3 Prior calibration
In addition to the MTS needed to define the prior form (6-7), supplementary prior information
must be available for the calibration of (m, β˜(m)). In the two following paragraphs we
consider some cases commonly encountered in RRA.
2.3.1 Calibrating β˜(m)
In RRA, it can occur that the analyst benefits from qualitative information on the nature of
aging of Σ. For instance, assuming β0 = 0, if the expert can answer the question what is the
probability 0 < αβe < 1 that Σ is submitted to aging?, one would have a priori P (β < βe) =
1− αβe with βe = 1 and consequently
β˜(m) = 2mβe/χ
2
2m(1− αβe) (8)
where χ2m(q) is the q−order percentile of the χ2m distribution. Other similar questions can
be asked over accelerated aging (βe = 2) and extreme cases (βe = 5) reflecting inconceivable
kinetics of aging in industrial applications [2, 23]. Otherwise, databases of typical β values
(e.g., http://www.barringer1.com/wdbase.htm) can be used to quantify some alternative fea-
tures of the gamma prior.
However, most frequently (as in Example 1), other quantitative information is available
under the form of a single or several credibility intervals, one of whose bounds is the pre-
viously chosen MTS. We consider p ≥ 1 supplementary (non-independent) specifications
Ωp = {tαi , αi}i∈{1,...,p}, sorted by increasing order (αi < αi+1 and tαi < tαi+1). Given m,
calibrating β˜(m) under those predictive constraints can be done by minimizing a distance
Dm(f∗, fpi) where f∗ is a pdf of T respecting exactly the MTS and the specifications listed
in Ωp. To avoid dealing with the infinite number of possible f
∗, we adopt the approach
proposed by Cooke [13]: D is chosen as the discrete Kullback-Leibler loss function between
required and elicited marginal features
Dm(f∗, fpi) =
p∑
i=0
Pf∗
(
T ∈ [tαi , tαi+1 ]
)
log
Pf∗
(
T ∈ [tαi , tαi+1 ]
)
Pfpi
(
T ∈ [tαi , tαi+1 ]
)
=
p∑
i=0
(αi+1 − αi) log (αi+1 − αi)(
α
(e)
i+1 − α(e)i
) (9)
where tα0 = 0, tαp+1 =∞, α0 = α(e)0 = 0, αp+1 = α(e)p+1 = 1, and for i ∈ {1, . . . , p}
α
(e)
i =
∫∫
FW (tαi |η, β)pi(η, β) dηdβ.
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The convexity of this loss function in its argument pi and, given m and β, the one-to-one
continuous correspondence between pi(β|β˜(m)) and β˜(m) allows for a unique solution of the
calibration problem
β˜∗(m) = arg min
pi(.|β˜(m))
Dm(f∗, fpi).
From (8), estimating β˜∗(m) is similar to select αβe = 0.5 and minimizing (9) in the prior
median β∗e . This provides a direct view of the underlying aging and numerical estimations
were found slightly more robust than those of the prior mean, or those of the best order α∗βe
if, conversely, βe is fixed. Therefore we temporarily note β˜(m) = β˜m(βe). For a given m, a
combination of golden section search and successive parabolic interpolation [10] can achieve
a robust optimization of βe, provided the α
(e)
i are smoothly computed at each step of the
algorithm. A smooth Monte Carlo estimation can be obtained using a unique importance
sampling run β1, . . . , βM ∼ G(m,m/βe,0), with large M , where βe,0 is a chosen starting point:
α
(e)
i (m,βe) ' 1−
(
βe,0
β˜m(βe)
)m
1
M
M∑
j=1
[(
1 +
t
βj
αi
bα(m,βj)
)
exp
(
βj
[
1
β˜m(βe)
− 1
βe,0
])]−m
.
Note that
Err(m) = Dm
(
f∗, fpi(.|β˜∗(m))
)
measures the expert incoherency with respect to the predictive Weibull distribution, given a
virtual sample of size m in agreement with the expert opinion. If Err(m) remains large for
many m, the Weibull choice for the virtual data (and therefore for any real dataset, provided
the expert is relevant for the problem) is at least debatable, not to say probably inappropriate.
2.3.2 Calibrating m
The calibration of m must be adapted to the experimental context. A decisionner can impose
a given virtual size to improve the clarity of the posterior result. For instance, Marin and
Robert [27] proposed to give to the virtual size parameter of Zellner’s g−prior (on regressors
of a gaussian linear regression problem) the value m = 1 by default. In a similar context,
another possibility, proposed by Celeux et al. [11] and Liang et al. [24] among others, is to
establish an upper hierarchical level in the Bayesian model by considering m as a random
variable for which a weakly informative prior must be elicited. A last possibility is to use m
as a discussion tool between the analyst and the expert, since the meaning of m is under-
standable outside the statistical field. Some heuristic methods in this sense are discussed in
[8].
However our aim as a Bayesian analyst is mainly to measure the strenght of the expert
opinion (assumed being correctly reflected through the prior modelling) through m. Besides,
when the experts are no longer questionable and only a summary of their past opinions
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remains available, it seems somewhat difficult to elicit a hyperprior on this parameter. Then
we suggest that m should be integrated as the minimizer of the expert incoherency risk,
namely
m∗ = arg min
m≥0
Err(m).
It is the analyst’s decision to minimize this risk on IN∗ (not to loose the virtual size meaning)
or IR∗+. In our experiments we chose IR
∗
+ to get the closest prior to the expert opinion. Ob-
viously, one can avoid eliciting a too informative prior by limiting the minimization domain
to (0, n].
Example 2.( pursuing Example 1). For a continuum of values of m, we display on Figures 1
and 2 the optimized β˜∗(m) and the corresponding risk Err(m), respectively, for both experts.
In both cases, the shape of m 7→ Err(m) allows for a unique solution m∗. We find m∗ = 3.36
for expert E1 and m∗ = 2.50 for expert E2. This is logical since E1 is more informative than
E2. However, all values β˜∗(m) for expert E1 appear unrealistic in an industrial physical con-
text, testifying from exponential uncontrolled aging, assuming the Weibull model is correct.
Especially, the calibrated β˜∗(m∗) = 16.5, which induces a peaked normal behavior of the prior
predictive distribution (cf. [15]). On the contrary, the opinion of expert E2 remains physically
plausible (β˜∗(m∗) = 4.9) although the underlying aging is still strong. The corresponding cov-
erage matching error |1 − (α(e)t1 − α(e)t2 )/90%|, where α(e)ti is the effective percentile order for
ti ∈ {100, 200} or ti ∈ {300, 500}, is plotted in Figure 3 and shows a good adequacy between
the wanted and effective credible domains: less than 5% error in all cases, and less than 0.2%
and 0.004% when choosing the calibrated m∗, for experts E1 and E2 respectively.
2.4 Aggregation of independent expert opinions
In cases when the aggregation of i = 1, . . . , p priors is chosen as a way to avoid interacting
biases in a group of experts, it yields a similar information to that carried by a global virtual
sample, which is the union of all experts’ samples t˜mi . Because they are not explicitly known,
one may use a concatenation of known samples s˜m1 , . . . , s˜mp from another model M(η, β)
such that their parametric likelihood (η, β) 7→ `(˜sm1 , . . . |η, β) leads to the same inference as
the whole virtual sample. Indeed, we can show easily (cf. Lemma 1 in Appendix) that
piJ
(
η, β |˜tm1 , . . . , t˜mp
)
= piJM
(
η, β |˜sm1 , . . . , s˜mp
) ∝ piJ(η, β) p∏
i=1
`(˜smi |η, β).
Next proposition, proved in Appendix, gives an example of such a likelihood (said virtual
likelihood) for a single expert opinion.
Proposition 2. Consider s˜m = (kα,m, βtα,m), where kα,m = ((1− α)−1/m − 1)−1 and
βtα,m = β˜(m)/(1 + β˜(m) log tα), as a sample whose components follow independently the
G(m,m(tα/η)β) and IG(m,mβ) distributions, respectively. Then it defines a virtual likeli-
hood for an expert opinion summarized by (tα, α, β˜(m)).
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After simple algebra, the resulting prior for all expert opinions is of the same form (6-7),
for which (respecting intuition) m =
∑p
i=1mi, bα(m,β) =
∑p
i=1 bαi(mi, β) and
β˜(m) = m
(
p∑
i=1
mi
β˜i(mi)
)−1
.
Example 3.( pursuing Example 2). Denote (pi1, pi2) the priors calibrated in Example 2 for
each expert. Denote pi3 the aggregating prior. Although pi3 appears less relevant than pi2
with respect to a Weibull model in a RRA context, we have no supplementary information to
weight the strenght of its corresponding virtual sample in pi3. Then, by defect, pi3 is defined
by
m = 5.86, bα(β) = 7.33 · (250)β , β˜ = 8.30.
Corresponding prior predictive densities are plotted on Figure 4. As it could be expected, the
aggregation prior realizes a trade-off between the two priors in the sense it favors the common
median according to an intermediate peak, due to the addition of spread virtual data (expert
E2) to concentrated virtual data (expert E1).
2.5 Prior equitability among Weibull models
Weibull models are often used as bricks for more general reliability models, like competing
risk models [7] or mixtures [40]. Especially, a usual challenge in RRA to choose between
exponential and Weibull models. Since the exponential is nested into the Weibull model
(β = 1), a simple likelihood ratio test can be carried out in the frequentist framework. A
Bayes factor is also easy to compute in our framework. Logically, both models share the
same prior elicitation method, with the same MTS.
Then denote (mE ,mW ) the two corresponding virtual sizes, (piE , piW ) the associated
priors, and assume the more complex prior piW has been calibrated. How should mE be
calibrated such that none of the prior Bayesian models is arbitrarily favored in absence of
real data? The problem of defining such a prior equitability to reduce bias in posterior
selection has been considered by many authors (see [11] for a review), who proposed several
rules. Celeux et al. (2006) [11] gave decisive arguments to calibrate piE such that it minimizes
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between predictive distributions
m∗E = argmE min KL (fpiW , fpiE (.|mE))
where, after simple algebra,
fpiE (t|mE) = mE
bmEα (mE , 1)
(bα(mE , 1) + t)mE+1
.
A unique Monte Carlo sampling of fpiW can be used to get a smooth description of the KL
divergence and its derivative in m, so that a coupled Newton-Raphson method can provide
a good estimate of m∗E . This strategy can be carried out on more complex Weibull models,
sorting them through their decreasing order of degree of freedom. If all authors have empha-
sized the difficulty of this task when nested models are nonconjugate with multidimensional
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parameters, our framework leads to a rather simple optimization.
Example 4.( pursuing Example 3). For various values of mE, the KL divergence is plotted
for expert E2 on Figure 5. The KL convexity allows for a unique solution m∗E = 6.70.
When modifying mW , the correspondence between mW and m
∗
E is plotted in Figure 6. A
similar calculus for expert E1 leads to a very high value of m∗E (upper than 200), because any
exponential predictive distribution cannot approximate well a peaked normal distribution. An
exponential assumption thus appears deeply irrelevant for this expert opinion.
It could have been expected that m∗E ≤ mW since the more complex Weibull model should
need more data that the exponential one to describe the same prior information. However, the
model simplification reduces the global uncertainty in the effective prior predictive distribution.
This has a direct impact on the virtual size mE which varies inversely to uncertainty measures.
3 Posterior inference
Thanks to the considerable development of numerical sampling methods, posterior computa-
tion is no longer burdensome in two-dimensional cases. Nonetheless, the conditional conjuga-
tion prior properties simplify the work of the Bayesian analyst. To be general in the RRA area
and in relation with Example 5, we assume that observed data tn = (t1, . . . , tn) contain r i.i.d
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uncensored data t
(u)
1 , . . . , t
(u)
r and n − r right-censored data. Denote δtn(β) =
∑n
i=1 t
β
i and
βtn = r/
∑r
j=1 log t
(u)
i . Then the joint posterior distribution has density pi(η|β, tn)pi(β|tn),
such that
η|β, tn ∼ GIG (m+ r, b(m,β) + δtn(β), β) ,
pi(β|tn) ∝ b
m
α (m,β)β
m+r−1
(bα(m,β) + δtn(β))
m+r exp
{
−β
(
m
β˜(m)
− r
βtn
)}
1{β≥β0}.
It is enough to obtain approximate posterior sampling of β to get a complete joint sampling
(using Gibbs sampling for η conditional to β). This can be made efficiently via the adap-
tive rejection sampling algorithm from Gilks and Wild [18]. In a noninformative context
(i.e., when m
m>0−−−→ 0+) which can be easily adapted to a more general setting, Tsionas [39]
proposed a gamma instrumental distribution ρ(β) whose mean is calculated to optimize the
acceptance rate.
A particular attention must be paid to the existence of posterior moments, especially the
first one which defines the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) in a RRA context. The conditional
posterior mean of η is
E[η|β, tn] = A(r,m, β)
(
m · ηβe|β + r · ηˆβ|β
)1/β
with ηe|β = k
1/m
α,m tα/m, ηˆ|β = r
−1∑n
i=1 t
β
i the conditional MLE, andA(r,m, β) = Γ(r +m− 1/β)/Γ(r +m),
so that the MTTF is not defined if β0 ≤ 1/(m+r). More generally, using an important result
of Sun and Speckman [38] (proof of Theorem 5), one can prove that the kth moment of the
posterior predictive density
E
[
T k|tn
]
=
∫∫
IR2
ηkΓ(1 + k/β)pi(η, β|tn) dηdβ,
∝
∫
IR+
Γ(1 + k/β)Γ(r +m− k/β)pi(β|tn) dβ,
exists only if β0 > k/(r + m) for any k > 0. This result is especially useful in the sense it
gives to the analyst a necessary requirement on the prior precision to justify the practical
handling of the posterior predictive distribution through usual statistical summaries, in re-
gards of the information available from really observed data. In mild conditions (r ≥ 5 and
k ≤ 2), choosing a defect β0 = k/r appears as a practical calculus artifice, and the more
justified choice β0 = 1 in aging studies is sufficient to ensure in practice the existence of
posterior predictive moments.
Example 5.( pursuing Example 4). We consider the right-censored lifetime data tn (n =
18, r = 10) from Table 2. They correspond to failure or stopping times collected on some
similar devices
∑
close to the one considered in Example 1. The maximum likelihood esti-
mator (MLE) is (ηˆn, βˆn) = (140.8, 4.51) with estimated standard deviations σˆn = (7.3, 1.8).
This strong aging is in agreement with the opinion of expert E2.
Choosing β0 = 0.1 does not modify significantly the calibration of priors for both experts,
and the resulting posterior distributions of the MTTF are plotted on Figure 7. The peak
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Figure 8: Posterior predictive densities for
both experts and their aggregation, and in
a noninformative framework.
observed when modelling a noninformative expert is due to the concentration of data far from
time regions favored by the priors, and logically the aggregating prior, as the most informative,
shifts the MTTF to the highest values.
The calibrated opinions of experts E1 and E2 have a relative weight of respectively 34% and
25% of the real data information transmitted to the posterior distribution, but, as it could be
expected, their optimism in terms of lifetime has a strong influence on this important func-
tion of interest. Note however that due to variance increasing, the left tails of the posterior
predictive pdf (Figure 8) are upper than the tails of a noninformative posterior predictive pdf.
This means that, given a small tγ (for instance a replacement time), the posterior estima-
tion of γ = P (T < tγ) will be slightly overestimated - if we add the experts’ opinions - with
respect to this given by an only data-driven prediction. On the contrary, when tγ is high, the
noninformative posterior can appear somewhat too conservative.
real failure times 134.9, 152.1, 133.7, 114.8, 110.0, 129.0, 78.7, 72.8, 132.2, 91.8
right-censored times 70.0, 159.5, 98.5, 167.2, 66.8, 95.3, 80.9, 83.2
Table 2: Lifetimes (months) of nuclear components from secondary water circuits.
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4 Discussion
The elicitation of a multidimensional prior, perceived as a reference posterior conditional to
virtual data supposed to reflect a perfect expert opinion, is a practical way of assessing indi-
rectly the correlations in the parameter space, coherently with the sampling model. Another
important gain is the possibility of assessing the prior uncertainty in an understandable way
by modulating the virtual size, for instance for sensitivity studies. This indicator of prior
information might help to increase the trust of a decision-maker in the posterior beliefs and
the acceptation of Bayesian assessments by control authorities. Unfortunately, such priors
are often untractable since they require to assess nonexhaustive statistics of the virtual data.
This is especially the case with the Weibull models.
In this article, however, we showed how this issue can be overcome, replacing those un-
tractable statistics with functionals such that the resulting prior answers to the statistical
specifications of the prior knowledge, under the form of percentiles. Note that other alter-
natives to percentiles could have been considered: for instance, following Percy [31], assume
an expert can provide an estimate te of the marginal MTTF or the mode Md[T ], namely
MTTF = E[T ] =
∫∫
IR2+
E[T |η, β]fW (t|η, β)pi(η, β) dηdβ,
Md[T ] = argt>0 max
∫∫
IR2+
fW (t|η, β)pi(η, β) dηdβ.
The first estimate te is thus related to a quadratic loss function Λ(t0, t|c1, c2) which assumes
the equality of costs c1 = c2 and a penalisation increasing with |t0 − t|, while the second can
be explained by the limit of a series of binary loss functions [33]. Following the principle
described in Proposition 1, one should replace b(˜tm, β) in (3) by, respectively (see [8] for
details),
b(m,β) =
(
Γ(m)
Γ(1 + 1/β)Γ(m− 1/β)
)β
tβe ,
b(m,β) =
(
mβ + 1
β − 1
)
tβe .
However, pi(β) is no longer (but remains close to) a gamma density, and furthermore these
two specifications require conditions over m and the domain of variation of pi(β) to be usable.
Indeed, one must guarantee β0 > 1 to ensure b(m,β) is well defined when te is specified as
a unique mode. This is coherent with the Weibull features, since the Weibull distribution
has a unique positive mode if and only if β > 1. As explained before, assuming aging is an
equivalent prior constraint placed on the model.
Since assuming a prior predictive percentile can be provided by an oriented questioning,
and fortunately leads to an explicit and versatile joint prior on Weibull parameters, we sug-
gest Bayesian reliability analysts should favor, as much as possible, this kind of elicitation.
This agrees with the vision historically promoted by Berger [4] (chap. 3) and Percy [31],
who considered that quantile-based approaches pose among best elicitation methods, the
estimation of probabilities of localization in given areas being simpler for experts than the
15
assessment of statistical moments.
Along the paper some remaining issues and limitations of the prior modelling have been
evoked, which are now discussed as potential avenues for future researches. These researches,
besides, will be dedicated to extend this methodology to other models which are often used
in reliability studies, especially extreme value models whose links with Weibull distributions
are well known.
It appears firstly that checking for the appropriateness of the Weibull model with respect
to the virtual data is a crucial task, since it allows to reveal divergences between an expert
opinion and the common sense of reliability practicioners when assuming the Weibull dis-
tribution for the lifetime of an industrial component submitted to aging. As the case for
expert E1 illustrates, providing a small prior credibility interval can underlie unrealistic val-
ues for the Weibull parameters. This agrees with the well-known behavior of RRA experts
of underestimating their self-uncertainty [23]. Therefore we suggest that spreading the prior
credibility orders such that a qualitative requirement is reached (e.g., Ppi(β < 2) = 0.5) can
give a more reasonnable summary of the real knowledge of Σ.
Another issue deals with the remaining uncertainty in expert opinion. In this article, we
proposed a simple definition of the ratio of subjective and objective information based on
virtual and real data sizes, understandable outside the community of statistics. It is clear
however that information quantities updated through Bayesian inference are also strongly
dependent on the possible conflicting issues between prior and real data, in the sense that
both can favor regions of the sample and parameter spaces which are far from each other
[17, 9]. Tools proposed in these two references should be carried out to check the internal
coherency of the Bayesian model beforehand.
Besides, we did not consider here the remaining difficulties occuring when the expert can
be suspected of bias, for instance because of motivational reasons [3] or dependency within
a group. Many other tools, based on test experiments, have been proposed in the literature
in order to quantify those biases (e.g. [34, 35, 23]). However, in absence of supplementary
information, we prefered respecting the summarized expert opinions the best we could in our
case-study.
Thus, the case of dependent experts has not been treated in this paper, since it remains
controversial in Bayesian statistics [30] and probably deserves specific studies in the RRA
area. Pursuing our view, two experts are dependent if they share virtual data from their past
experience, or if a part of a virtual sample is produced dependently from the other sample.
Dependency could then be introduced through a hierarchical mechanism of data production,
in the spirit of the supra-Bayesian approaches promoted by Lindley [26]. This theme will
also be considered in our next works.
In future studies, it will be necessary too to provide some calibration tools to take into
account the expert uncertainty and bias. A first avenue can simply be to add a hierarchical
level conditional to m. Indeed, we assumed here that the expert subjectivity mainly lies in
the self-estimation of the costs associated with a reliability decision, and thus (using notations
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from § 2.3) in the estimation of sorted orders α1 < . . . < αp. Let us denote α˜1 < . . . < α˜p
these prior estimates. If we pursue the virtual size idea, it appears logical to consider the αi
as correlated random variables such that, a priori,
α1, α2 − α1, . . . , αp − αp−1, 1− αp ∼ Dir (ν1, . . . , νp+1)
with νi − 1 being the number of virtual “past” observations of the event tαi−1 ≤ T ≤ tαi ,
which induces
∑p+1
i=1 νi = m + p + 1, the Dirichlet distribution appearing naturally from
well-known conjugation properties. Imposing E[αi − αi−1] = α˜i − α˜i−1 leads to elicit
νi = (m+ p+ 1) (α˜i − α˜i−1) .
The obvious correlation between prior estimates α˜i threatens to underestimate the prior
uncertainty of the αi, so that it appears more appropriate to help the expert providing
conditional probabilities by answering to the following question: what is the risk αi − αi−1
for Σ to break down before tαi knowing Σ still runs after tαi−1? Thus, the randomization
of values (α1, . . . , αp) imposes indirectly a prior distribution pi(β˜
∗(m)) rather than a single
value, and consequently, m should now be calibrated as the minimizer of the expected expert
incoherency risk
m∗ = arg min
m≥0
Epi(β˜∗(m))
[
Dm
(
f∗, fpi(.|β˜∗(m))
)]
.
But this calibration remains in facts difficult to carry out, since the untractability of pi(β˜∗(m))
imposes a double Monte Carlo approximation coupled to an optimization strategy. Our next
research will focus on simplifying this computational work.
Finally, we remind to the reader that other elicitation approaches of percentile orders are
possible, mainly based on the establishement of expert preferences on a series of bettings
such that α is not directly estimated but is progressively bounded [30]. Such methods are
robust with respect to perturbations of the often criticized expected utility criterion, since
they can lead to results that are independent of the behavior of the expert face to his or
her self-perception of the risk [1]. It thus should be worthy to adapt our modelling and the
calibration aspects to this type of elicitation, which could lead to more cautious, credible
statistical features of the prior modelling.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Gilles Celeux (INRIA), Eric Parent and Merlin Keller (ENGREF) for
numerous enriching discussions, advices and references. He thanks Francois Billy, Emmanuel
Remy, Alberto Pasanisi (EDF R&D) too for fruitful discussions about the specific issues
raised by the industrial context of the study.
References
[1] Abdellaoui, M. (2000). Parameter-free elicitation of utilities and probability weighting functions,
Management Science, 46: 1497-1512.
17
[2] Bacha, M., Celeux, G., Ide´e, E., Lannoy, A. and Vasseur, D. (1998). Estimation de mode`les de
dure´es de vie fortement censure´es, Eyrolles (in French).
[3] Benson, P.G., and Nichols, M.L. (1982). An investigation of motivational bias in subjective
predictive probability distribution. Decision Sci., 13: 10-59.
[4] Berger, J.O. (1985). Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis. Springer-Verlag, New
York.
[5] Berger, J.O and Bernardo, J.M. (1992). On the development of reference priors (with discussion).
In: J.M. Bernardo, J.O. Berger, A.P. Dawid and A.F.M. Smith, Eds., Bayesian Statistics 4, Oxford
University Press: 35-60.
[6] Berger, J.O. and Sun, D. (1993). Bayesian analysis for the Poly-Weibull Distribution, J. Amer.
Statis. Assoc., 88: 1412-1418.
[7] Bertholon, H., Bousquet, N., Celeux, G. (2006). An alternative competing risk model to the
Weibull distribution in lifetime data analysis, Lifetime Data Analysis, 12: 481-504.
[8] Bousquet, N. (2006). A Bayesian analysis of industrial lifetime data with Weibull distributions,
Research Report RR-6025, INRIA.
[9] Bousquet, N. (2006). Diagnostics of prior-data agreement in applied Bayesian analysis. J. Appl.
Statist., 35: 1011-1029.
[10] Brent, R. (1973). Algorithms for Minimization without Derivatives. Englewood Cliffs N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
[11] Celeux, G., Marin, J.M., Robert, C.P. (2006). Se´lection baye´sienne de variables en re´gression
line´aire. Journal de la Socie´te´ Franc¸aise de Statistique, 147: 59-79 (in French).
[12] Clarke, B.S. (1996). Implications of reference priors for prior information and for sample size,
J. Amer. Statis. Assoc., 91: 173-184.
[13] Cooke, R.M. (1991). Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science.
New York: Oxford University Press.
[14] De Finetti, B. (1937). La pre´vision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Annales de l’Institut
Henri Poincare´ (in French), 7: 1-68.
[15] Dodson, B. (2006). The Weibull Analysis Handbook (2nd ed.). ASQ Quality Press, p. 7.
[16] Efron, B. (1986). Why isn’t everyone a Bayesian? (with Discussion), The American Statistician,
40: 1-11.
[17] Evans, M., & Moshonov, H. (2006). Checking for prior-data conflict. Bayesian analysis, 1:
893-914.
[18] Gilks, W.R., Wild, P. (1992). Adaptive rejection sampling for Gibbs sampling. Applied Statistics,
41: 337-348.
[19] Kadane, J.B., Wolfson, J.A. (1998). Experiences in elicitation, The Statistician, 47: 3-19.
[20] Kaminskiy, M.P., and Krivtsov, V.V. (2005). A Simple Procedure for Bayesian Estimation of
the Weibull Distribution, IEEE Trans. Reliability, 54: 612-616.
18
[21] Ka´rny´, M., Nedoma, P., Khailova, N., Pavelkova´, L. (2003). Prior information in structure
estimation. IEEE Proceedings in Control Theory and Applications, 150: 643-653.
[22] Kontkanen, P., Myllyma¨ki, P., Silander, T., Tirri, H., Gru¨nwald, P. (1998). Bayesian and
information-theoretic priors for Bayesian networks parameters. Lecture notes in computer sci-
ence. In the proceedings of the ECML-98 European conference on machine learning, Chemnitz,
Germany, 1398: 89-94.
[23] Lannoy, A. and Procaccia, H. (2001). L’utilisation du jugement d’expert en suˆrete´ de fonction-
nement, Tec & Doc (in French).
[24] Liang, F., Paulo, R., Molina, G., Clyde, M., Berger, J. (2008). Mixtures of g-priors for Bayesian
variable selection. J. American Statist. Assoc., 103: 410-423.
[25] Lin, X., Pittman, J. and Clarke, B. (2007). Information Conversion, Effective Samples, and
Parameter Size. IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, 53: 4438-4456.
[26] Lindley, D.V. (1983). Reconciliation of probability distributions. Operations Research, 31: 866-
880.
[27] Marin, J.M., Robert, C.P. (2010). Les bases de la statistique baye´sienne. Rapport des Universite´s
Montpellier II & Dauphine - CREST (in French).
[28] Morita, S., Thall, P.F. and Mueller, P. (2007). Determining the effective sample size of a para-
metric prior. UT MD Anderson Cancer Center Department of Biostatistics, Working Paper Series.
Working Paper 36.
[29] Neal, R.M. (2001). Transferring prior information between models using imaginary data. Tech-
nical Report 0108, Dept. Statistics, Univ. Toronto.
[30] O’Hagan, A., Buck, C. E., Daneshkhah, A., Eiser, J. R., Garthwaite, P. H., Jenkinson, D.
J., Oakley, J. E., Rakow, T. (2006), Uncertain Judgements: Eliciting Expert Probabilities. John
Wiley and Sons, Chichester.
[31] Percy, D.F. (2003). Subjective Reliability Analysis Using Predictive Elicitation. In: Mathemati-
cal and Statistical Methods in Reliability, B.H. Lindqvist & K.A. Doksum (eds). Quality, Reliability
& Engineering Statistics 7, World Scientific Publishing Co.: Singapore, pp. 57-72.
[32] Press, S.J. (2003). Subjective and Objective Bayesian Statistics (second edition), New York:
Wiley.
[33] Robert, C.P. (2001). The Bayesian Choice. A Decision-Theoretic Motivation (second edition),
Springer.
[34] Singpurwalla, N.D. and Song, M.S. (1986). An analysis of Weibull lifetime data incorporating
expert opinion, in Probability and Bayesian Statistics (R.Viertl ed.), Plenum Pub.Corp.: 431-442.
[35] Singpurwalla, N.D. (1988). An interactive PC-Based procedure for reliability assessment incor-
porating expert opinion and survival data, J. Amer. Statis. Assoc., 83: 43-51.
[36] Soland, R. (1969). Bayesian analysis of the Weibull process with unknown scale and shape
parameters, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 18: 181-184.
[37] Sun, D. (1997). A note on noninformative priors for Weibull distributions, J. Statist. Planning
and Inference, 61: 319-338.
19
[38] Sun, D., Speckman, P.L. (2005). A note on the nonexistence of posterior moments, Can. J.
Statist., 33: 591-601.
[39] Tsionas, E.G. (2000). Posterior analysis, prediction and reliability in three-parameter Weibull
distributions, Commun. Statist. - Theory Meth., 29(7): 1435-1449.
[40] Tsionas, E.G. (2002). Bayesian analysis of finite mixtures of distributions, Commun. Statist. -
Theory Meth., 31(1): 37-48.
[41] Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Sci-
ence, 185: 1124-1131.
[42] Unwin, S.D., Cazzoli, E.G., Davis, R.E., Khatib-Rahbar, M., Lee, M., Nourbakhsh, H., Park,
C.K., Schmidt, E. (1989). An information-theoretic basis for uncertainty analysis: application to
the QUASAR severe accident study, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 26: 143-162.
[43] Zellner, A. (1986). On assessing Prior Distributions and Bayesian Regression analysis with g-
prior distribution regression using Bayesian variable selection, In Bayesian inference and decision
techniques : Essays in Honor of Bruno De Finetti: 233-243, North-Holland, Elsevier.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote fm(β) =
βm−1
(bα(m,β))
m exp
(
m
β
β(˜tm)
)
and gm(β) =
(
1 +
tβα
bα(m,β)
)−m
.
Then, renaming b(˜tm, β) in bα(m,β) in (3-4),
Ppi(T ≤ tα) =
∫∫
IR+×IR+
FW (tα|η, β)pi(η|β)pi(β) dηdβ,
= 1−∆m
∫
IR+
fm(β)gm(β) dβ
where ∆−1m =
∫
IR+
fm(β) dβ which must be necessarily finite to get a proper pi(β). Assum-
ing Ppi(T ≤ tα) = α leads to
∫
IR+
fm(β)hm(β) dβ = 0 where hm(β) = gm(β) − (1 − α)
which is continuous in β ≥ 0 if β 7→ bα(m,β) is assumed continuous for any m > 0. Since
β 7→ fm(β) > 0 except possibly on a finite number of points in IR+, hm(β) = 0 almost
everywhere in IR+. Expression (5) follows immediately.
Lemma 1. Denote M1 and M2 two sampling models with same parameter θ. Denote
t˜mi a non-observed M1−sample with likelihood `M(1) . Let s˜mi = g(˜tmi) be an observed
M2−sample with likelihood `M(2) , such that θ 7→ `M(2)(θ) ∝ `M(1)i (θ). Denote pi
J a prior
measure on θ and piJM(j) its posterior knowing likelihood `M(j) . Then for p various samples
t˜m1 , . . . , t˜mp , one has
piJM(1)
(
θ|˜tm1 , . . . , t˜mp
)
= piJM(2)
(
θ|˜sm1 , . . . , s˜mp
)
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Proof. The proof is straightforward, and we can consider only two non-observed samples
t˜m1 and t˜m2 (corresponding possibly to two independent expert opinions). Then
piJM(1)
(
θ|˜tm1 , t˜m2
) ∝ `M(1) (t˜m1 |θ)piJM(1) (θ|˜tm2) ,
∝ `M(2) (˜sm1 |θ)piJ(θ)`M(1)
(
t˜m2 |θ
)
,
∝ `M(2) (˜sm1 |θ) `M(2) (˜sm2 |θ)piJ(θ),
∝ `M(2) (˜sm1 |θ)piJM(2) (θ|˜sm2) ,
∝ piJM(2) (θ|˜sm1 , s˜m2)
and the equality follows by immediate normalization.
Proof of Proposition 2. The Weibull likelihood of the m virtual data summarized by
(tα, α, β˜(m)) is proportional to `(η, β) = pi(η, β)/pi
J(η, β) where pi(η, β) is defined by (6-7).
Modify the parametrization using µ = η−β . Thus
`(µ, β) ∝ µm exp (−µbα(m,β))βm exp
(
−m β
β˜(m)
)
,
∝
[{
µ (tα)
β
}m
exp
{
−µkα,m (tα)β
}] [
βm exp
{
−m β
β˜(m)
}
exp {−mβ log tα}
]
,
∝ `1 (kα,m|µ, β) `2 (βtα,m|β)
where
`1 (kα,m|µ, β) ∝
{
µ (tα)
β
}m
Γ(m)
km−1α,m exp
{
−kα,m (tα)β
}
which is the likelihood arising from considering kα,m ∼ G(m,mµ(tα)β), and
`2 (βtα,m|β) ∝
(mβ)
m
Γ(m)
βm−1tα,m exp
{
−mβ 1 + β˜(m) log tα
β˜(m)
}
which is the likelihood arising from considering βtα,δ ∼ IG(m,mβ).
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